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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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Foreign Relations Committee on both sides of the aisle that there is really nothing left to say. Senators MANSFIELD, FULBRIGHT, HUMPHREY, CHURCH, SALTONSTALL, and DIRKSEN, among others, have in my judgment, made an unanswerable case in support of the treaty.

I rise today for a different, if related subject. For I have never been torn by the doubts which appear to have tortured many of my colleagues.

I have long been convinced that the rational, intelligent, compassionate, as well as the tough, hard-boiled self-interest answer is: Of course we shall vote to give our advice and consent to the treaty negotiated by Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman, a highly experienced and qualified diplomat, on behalf of the President with the support of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The military risks of ratification are minimal; the political risks of failing to ratify serious. The arguments to the contrary of those who oppose the treaty are to me quite unconvincing.

We have heard a good deal today about the so-called "secret testimony" given by military men before the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services. This "secret testimony" was also available to the Committee on Foreign Relations, which nonetheless voted 16 to 1 to report the treaty favorably. I have no doubt that the "secret testimony" was available to the President of the United States, to the Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, to the Secretary of Defense and to each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; nonetheless, these top level civilians and military men recommend to the Senate that the treaty be ratified.

It is frightening even to contemplate what would happen to the position of the United States all over the world if we were to repudiate the action of our President and Commander in Chief and every one of his principal advisers after 92 other nations had ratified the treaty.

Yet a recent poll indicates that, while 73 Senators—now, I am happy to say, 74 Senators, including the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS]—have stated their intention to support the hand of our Commander in Chief, 12 have stated that they will vote against ratification and 13 or 14 are said to be in doubt.

How is it possible that 12 Senators, and perhaps more, can take so atavistic an attitude toward this treaty? I use the word advisedly for the result, if not the motivation—on which I do not pass—of a negative vote is quite clearly to return to a philosophy of the jungle; the dog-eat-dog attitude of primitive man; the fear of something new; the fear, also, of the powerful and unfriendly nearby tribe. Man has conquered this attitude slowly but surely during the long centuries since he came down out of the trees. We must conquer it again.

If one looks at the names of Senators who are stated to oppose this treaty or to be doubtful about it, the conclusion

is irresistible that the overwhelming majority of them come from the most conservative Members of this body. Several of them are generals in the Armed Forces, men who have rendered notable service to our country by wearing its uniform in time of war and in combat.

Several more are ranking members of the Armed Services Committee, where, day in and day out, the demands of the military for more and bigger arms are heard.

It is perhaps not too much to say that the opposition to the treaty, declared and potential, with one or two conspicuous exceptions, represents the hard core—the low-water mark, if we will—of the Senate establishment, those who belong and a few who are potential members. I am happy that their ranks are so thin. I honor them for their sincerity and their dedication to the cause of our country, but I profoundly disagree with their conclusions about the treaty—conclusions which, in my judgment, are opposed to our long-range national security and the social, economic, and political interests of our country at home and abroad.

But let us not delude ourselves. The establishment has not given up. It is still determined to force the United States full steam ahead in an accelerated arms race if that can be done. That has been made clear in speech after speech during this debate. Moreover, in this determination to push forward unilaterally with the arms race the establishment is being joined by several Senators who do not usually follow its lead.

So one important question remains: Where do we go from here? What is the next step? On Friday, the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] said, and I quote:

What will the next step be? Will we be presented with a treaty banning tests in all environments accompanied by the argument that the Senate has already endorsed such a treaty in view of the preamble of the present treaty? Will a nonaggression pact follow? Are we, by endorsing this treaty, including its preamble, indicating in advance that we approve the concept of an agreement on complete general disarmament?

Much as I fear the effect of this so-called first step I have even greater fears of what it may portend in the way of further compacts with the Soviets which may affect the quality or quantity of our Military Establishment even more drastically. It has already been suggested that there be a reciprocal burning of bombers and that we unilaterally cut back on the production of nuclear weapons to a substantial extent. Is this treaty a first step toward activities of this type? I do not say it is; I simply raise the point that very possible this will be a part of the picture.

Personally, I hope that the next step will be a further relaxation of tension along the lines apparently feared by the Senator from Mississippi. The negotiation from our present great strength, which, of course, we must maintain for the time being, of a treaty of general and complete disarmament under enforceable world law as advocated by President Kennedy and, before him, by President Eisenhower while Christian A. Herter was Secretary of State, is the ulti-

mate purpose of the country. This would require the elimination of military establishments all over the world, including our own. With that elimination, radical as it may seem to some Senators, might even come the abolition of the Senate Armed Services Committee and its Preparedness Subcommittee.

That this is the fixed long-range policy of the United States was made clear by our President and Commander in Chief on September 25, 1961, in an address to the General Assembly of the United Nations, where President Kennedy advocated:

First. The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their reestablishment in any form whatsoever other than those required to preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations peace force.

Second. The elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery, other than those required for a United Nations peace force and for maintaining internal order.

Third. The institution of effective means for the enforcement of international agreements, for the settlement of disputes, and for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.

Fourth. The establishment and effective operation of an international disarmament organization within the framework of the United Nations to insure compliance at all times with all disarmament obligations.

Often in the past I have spoken in support of President Kennedy's advocacy of general and complete disarmament under enforceable world law. We are still a long way from that goal which, in my opinion, we must achieve if our children and our children's children are to have a chance of survival; if we are to eliminate the delicate balance of terror by which we presently live and if we are to leave the forces of mutual suspicion behind us and move toward that goal of peace on earth and good will to man which is the essence of the Christian and, indeed, of the other great religions.

This treaty is a very small step in that direction. The cold war is perceptibly thawed. The Russians are more receptive than for many years to suggestions looking toward a relaxation of tensions. They, too, have declared themselves, time after time, as in accord with President Kennedy's great speech referred to earlier and that other fine address on the same subject at American University on June 10 of this year.

The Senator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON] spoke on Friday of his fear that the American people might lapse into a state of euphoria. He spoke with concern of the possibility that "peace is breaking out all over." The warning is apt. We must maintain our military strength so long as it is needed. And it is needed now and for the foreseeable future. In the words of the President:

Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.

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And let us always negotiate from strength.

Nobody knows whether the Soviet Union is going to spend more or less money on military hardware than we plan to spend. It is anybody's guess. Of course, we must keep our guard up and not relax.

But there are good grounds for speculating that the Soviet may decide to cut down unilaterally on its military expenditures for economic reasons and that it is prepared to renounce nuclear warfare as an instrument of aggressive national policy, as the Senator from Vermont [Mr. Aiken] suggested Friday.

Let us remember that disarmament is our ultimate goal. Let us persevere in seeking it at the United Nations, in Geneva, and elsewhere. Let us be the aggressors for peace, not for war.

I suggest it is nonsense to expect that all the difficult problems confronting the world and separating our position from that of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists can be solved at once. The so-called hard view reported in the newspapers and said to be held by certain individuals in the State Department and which requires the solution of all political problems before we can ease tensions and move toward cooperation in areas where there is no inherent conflict is as atavistic as opposition to this treaty.

And let it never be said that the Senate of the United States, with all of its wonderful history and fine tradition, was the body which made the further search for a just and lasting peace impossible.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I rise to congratulate the Senator from Pennsylvania on his speech today, ably emphasizing the need for keeping in our minds the objectives set forth by our President and Commander in Chief 2 years ago, that some day—we ourselves will never see it; probably not our children—we hope our children's children will see a world that is at peace and where there is a state of complete disarmament.

Mr. CLARK. I thank my friend from Rhode Island for his kind words. I am not only a good deal older than he is, but more optimistic, and I hope to see that day before I die.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CLARK. I am happy to yield to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. I rise to inquire of the distinguished Senator if he thinks that Mr. Khrushchev feels this treaty is to his benefit.

Mr. CLARK. I assume he does, or he would not be prepared to sign it. I assume it is to our benefit, too, or the Senator's Commander in Chief, and mine, would not have recommended it to the Senate.

Mr. THURMOND. I respectfully call to the Senator's attention an Associated Press article which comes out of Moscow, under date of August 22, which states:

The Soviet Union told Red China the limited nuclear test ban was a positive gain for communism because it would perpetuate the liquidation of the onetime American nuclear monopoly, and freeze each side's nuclear power.

A 20,000-word official Government statement Wednesday derided Communist Chinese charges that signing of the treaty marked a Soviet "capitulation" to the United States as the words of "simpletons." It told the Chinese they would do well to improve their economic situation and forget about nuclear weapons.

The statement, in reply to the August 15th attack on Soviet policy by Peiping, said that for years it would have been against Soviet interests to have a test ban unless the United States agreed to destroy all its nuclear weapons.

Does not the conclusion seem to be that a few years ago Mr. Khrushchev did not want a nuclear test ban treaty, because we were ahead, but that now, inasmuch as they conducted more than 100 tests in 1961 and 1962, and have gained a tremendous store of invaluable and critical nuclear knowledge, which we need, on high-yield weapons and high-altitude antiballistic missile weapons, and now that Mr. Khrushchev is ahead on the high-yield weapons, he is willing to freeze the situation, if we were to ratify the treaty. Does not the Senator know that the only way we can catch up on high-yield weapons, is by testing in the atmosphere, which is prohibited in the treaty? And is it not true that with regard to low-yield weapons, it is admitted that we may be ahead, but that the Soviets can overcome their deficiency by testing underground, whereas with the high-yield weapons we will have to test out in the atmosphere, and that is the kind of testing which is prohibited? Therefore, if that is the case, the freezing would result in a great advantage to the Soviets because they are ahead of us in high-yield weapons?

Mr. CLARK. The Senator has asked me a great many questions. I shall try to respond to them en bloc. The Senator from South Carolina is certainly entitled to his opinion. He is a very able general in the Army Reserve. He is a member of the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee. I know he has given great and careful attention to this subject from his first-class mind. However, I respectfully say—and I see no need to go into greater detail—that the opinion of the Senator from South Carolina is not shared by at least four-fifths of the Members of the Senate, is not shared by the leading military men of the United States, is not shared by the leading scientists of the United States, is not shared by the President of the United States, our Commander in Chief, or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

With all due respect, and with the highest regard and deep affection for the Senator from South Carolina, I prefer to take the judgment of these men to his.

Mr. THURMOND. I invite attention to a news dispatch which came out of Tokyo. This is also an Associated Press dispatch:

Tokyo.—The Soviet Union told Communist China today there was no need for it to try to manufacture an atom bomb because if attacked it could count on Russian nuclear might under the friendship and mutual assistance treaty.

In a Japanese-language broadcast, Moscow Radio reiterated that, despite Chinese-Soviet differences, the treaty with China remains in effect. A Moscow commentator asked:

"Why does China feel it must have an atom bomb? Is it for her defense? In this connection we would like to remind China of two things.

"One is that there is a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and China, and even now it continues in effect.

"The second is that the Soviet Union has repeatedly pointed out that it considers an attack on the Peoples' Republic of China to be an attack on the Soviet Union itself. Therefore, if the Peoples' Republic of China is subject to an attack, the entire might of the Soviet Union will fall upon the aggressor. What greater security can China ask?"

The commentator chastised Peiping for groundless reasoning in arguing that the limited nuclear test ban treaty is aimed at restricting possession of nuclear weapons to the original signatory nations, the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain.

He declared that Moscow has already been prepared to enter into an acceptable agreement for a total nuclear weapons ban, and that Soviet nuclear policy in no way jeopardizes the Socialist camp.

Is there any question in the Senator's mind that Russia meant what is stated in these two articles?

Mr. CLARK. Again the Senator has asked me several questions. I would answer, first, yes, there is some doubt in my mind in view of a number of happenings with respect to the Chinese-Soviet relationships during the past few weeks and months, and also because there is always a question in my mind as to whether the Soviets will keep any treaty which they negotiate. Therefore, there is doubt.

My second answer is that it seems to me that the point raised by the able Senator from South Carolina is irrelevant and immaterial to the issue before the Senate today.

Mr. THURMOND. Does not the Senator feel that this goes to the very heart of the so-called rift between Russia and China?

Mr. CLARK. It seems to me that the so-called rift between Russia and China has nothing whatever to do with whether we should ratify the treaty. I believe the rift is deep, and I hope it will become deeper. It might be that Russia would keep its treaty if we attacked China. However, we have no intention of attacking China. In any event, in my opinion we are not giving away one bit of our military power by ratifying the treaty.

Mr. THURMOND. Some proponents of the treaty have cited the rift between Russia and China as one of the main reasons why we should ratify the treaty.

Mr. CLARK. I can speak only for myself. I do not take that view.

Mr. THURMOND. Therefore, it is said, because there is a so-called rift between these two countries, perhaps there is a chance that we can work with the Soviets. Does the Senator feel we can ever work with the Soviets, or trust the Soviets, or is the Senator of the opinion that the Soviets still have as their goal the domination and enslavement of the world, and that we cannot trust them?

Mr. CLARK. Again the Senator is asking me many questions in one question. When the enlightened self-interest of the Soviet Union coincides with our enlightened self-interest, as I think